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This paper develops a standard neoclassical growth framework to examine the recent history of 
economic growth in Korea. In our framework, TFP change is a key to understanding a country’s 
economic growth, and is assumed to reflect technological progress exogenously given to the country in 
the form of improving OECD best practices as well as the country’s changing capacity to absorb the 
prevailing best practice. First, we find evidence that Korea’s extraordinary economic growth during 
the 1980s and early 1990s was achieved mainly through massive mobilizations of fixed capital 
investment. Our analytical framework clearly indicates that this type of economic growth is not 
sustainable due to diminishing marginal returns to capital. Nevertheless, Korea’s economic growth has 
never wound down except for a brief depression in 1998 in the middle of the economic crisis, mainly 
thanks to the country’s TFP that appears to have begun to grow strongly from 1992. This robust TFP 
growth considerably above the OECD average is expected to have enabled the Korean economy to defy 
the gravity of diminishing marginal returns and sustain its growth by creating ample additional room 
for capital accumulation. From 2003, economic growth in Korea visibly slowed down, and we find that 
noticeably stagnant TFP growth was largely behind this persistent slowdown. In the government’s 
efforts at fostering future economic growth, therefore, the fiscal measures targeted solely at the 
demand side would have only limited effects unless they are accompanied by other measures that would 
truly enhance the country’s level of TFP.  
 
 





Even before shock waves of the global financial crisis following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers struck Korea, the country had suffered a persistently weak economy for a number of 
years. The public frustration with sluggish economic growth throughout the previous 
administration subsequently cost the then incumbent party the presidential election that took 
place in December 2007. The weak capital investment was often blamed as a major culprit 
for this economic slowdown. In fact, non-residential fixed capital formation grew only an 
average of 2.8 percent annually during 2003-2006, compared to its growth over the two 
previous decades at an annual average of more than 10 percent.
1
 
Various factors have been presented as possible reasons for this remarkable slowdown in 
fixed capital investment. One of the most frequently cited in the press was the anti-business 
posture of the previous administration. It was alleged that the introduction of a series of 
government regulations detrimental to business during the previous administration 
undermined “the will to do business” and discouraged new corporate investment. Another 
popular line of argument laid the blame instead on the business community by lamenting loss 
                                                          
1 In calculating the average for the period 1981-2002, we did not include the sharp contraction of non-
residential fixed capital formation in 1998 during in the height of the  economic crisis.  
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of strong entrepreneurial spirit that appears to have never been in short supply in corporate 
chieftains in the 1960s and 1970s, such as late founders of Samsung and Hyundai who were 
arguably never afraid of taking risks and pushed ahead with large capital investments against 
the odds. Whatever incarnations they are of in, most of the arguments on the table are based 
on the assumption of “under-investment.” 
Whether the level of fixed capital investment during the previous administration was 
really lower than optimal or not is an empirical question, but it is difficult to expect that 
under-investment continued for five years just because of demand-side weakness due to 
factors such as politics and corporate culture. In fact, a standard neoclassical framework 
identifies total factor productivity (TFP) as a key determinant of a country’s pace of fixed 
capital investment. TFP growth is expected to expand out the country’s long-run level of 
capital stock and also accelerate the rate at which a given level of capital stock may grow in 
the economy. Our estimates of TFP growth for Korea using the Malmquist index provide 
evidence that the country’s TFP growth became visibly stagnant during 2003-2006. This 
torpidity in TFP growth is expected to have induced a slowdown in the country’s fixed 
capital investment during those years. The problem was after all a low growth rate of overall 
productivity. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a standard growth model to 
examine the Korean economy. Section 3 outlines the Malmquist index and its decomposition. 
This is followed by a discussion of data and estimation results in Section 4. Concluding 
remarks are made in the last section 
 
 
2. GROWTH MODEL 
 
We structure our analysis within a standard neoclassical framework with a constant, 
exogenous saving rate that traces back to Solow (1956) and Swan (1956).
2
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where Y is aggregate output, K is aggregate capital, and L is total employment. A > 0 is the 
level of TFP and  is a constant with 0 <  < 1. 
For simplicity, we suppose that the economy is closed and there are no government 
expenditures on goods and services. Hence, aggregate output is either consumed or invested 
in this economy. Investment is used to create new units of capital which depreciates at the 
constant rate  > 0. In addition, we assume a constant fraction of aggregate output is saved at 
the rate of s (0≤ s ≤1). Given that the amount saved equals the amount invested in a closed 
economy, the investment rate is also s in this economy. We also assume total employment 
grows at a constant, exogenous rate of n ≥ 0. 
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where y ≡ Y/L and k ≡ K/L 
                                                          
2 For a more detailed exposition of this framework, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). 









= (n+δ)  k‾          (3) 
 
If k is below  k‾ , k is expected to increase over time until it reaches  k‾. The growth rate of 
k at t along the transition is characterized by 
 
k̇ t/kt = sAkt
-(1-) 
- (n+ δ)         (4) 
 
It is worth to note that the growth rate of k falls as k increases and it approaches 0 as k 




k̇ t/kt = (n+ δ)            (5) 
 
 
Subsequently, the economy’s growth rate of capital per worker at t depends on the 
distance between the t period level of capital per worker, kt, and its steady-state level,  k‾. 
From Eq. (3),  k‾ in turn depends crucially on the level of TFP, A. An improvement in TFP 
will raise the steady-state level of capital per worker when the economy’s saving rate, 
depreciation rate, and employment growth rate remain constant. Hence, any changes in TFP 
are expected to have immediate effects on the growth rate of capital per worker. 
We illustrate the relationship between the economy’s TFP and capital growth in Figure 1. 
Starting from capital per worker in period 0, k0, with the level of TFP, A0, the economy’s 
growth rate of capital per worker is measured by ac with the steady-state level of capital per 
worker,  k‾0. This positive growth in capital per worker will result in a higher level of capital 
per worker in a future period 1, say k1. If the economy’s TFP remains the same, then the 
growth rate of capital per worker in period 1 will be measured by ab with the steady-state 
level of capital per worker continuing to be  k‾0. The new growth rate, ab, is lower than period 
0’s ac due to diminishing returns to capital. However, if there is an improvement in TFP 
from period 0 to period 1, the steady-state level of capital per worker will jump to a new 
level,  k‾1, under the new level of TFP, A1. We should note that period 1’s growth rate of 
capital per worker, measured by (ab + bd), can be higher than period 0’s growth rate, ac, 
with an improvement in TFP even when k1 is larger than k0.  
Figure 1 illustrates how a country may resist the gravity of diminishing returns to capital 
and achieve an accelerating pace of economic growth. TFP growth would shift the country’s 
steady-state position further away and may expand the distance between the current and 
steady-state levels of capital per worker, thereby inducing faster growth even at a higher 
level of capital per worker. Therefore, TFP growth has not only long-run implications for 
economic growth by altering the long-run or steady-state level of capital per worker, but it 
also has immediate effects on the current pace of economic growth. 
There are a number of different ways to conceptualize technological progress in the 
existing literature on economic growth. In this paper, we focus on the members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and assume that 
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progress includes not only innovations both in products and processes, but also any 
government policies and institutional changes that affect the position of the production 
function. Given that one primary role of the OECD is to promote the exchange of 
information among its member countries, the public good nature of technological progress 
within the grouping appears to be a reasonable assumption. In this regard, technological 
progress is assumed to be exogenously given to an individual country in the form of OECD 
best practices. However, each country is assumed to benefit from it in different degrees 
depending on its own absorptive capacity. In our analysis, therefore, TFP changes for Korea 
are assumed to reflect any changes in OECD best practices as well as changes in the 





3. THE MALMQUIST INDEX 
 
To estimate TFP changes, economists often use the tools of growth accounting. The aim 
of growth accounting is to produce the TFP residual which measures the portion of economic 
growth that is not explained by the growth in all measurable inputs. The growth accounting 
approach implicitly assumes that all units of production are technically efficient. However, 
the notion of TFP changes in our analysis implies that a country’s production may not be 
                                                          
3 Since Korea joined the OECD only in 1996, we are implicitly assuming that Korea had been able to 
observe OECD best practices even before its accession to the organization. This is not an entirely 
unrealistic assumption given that Korea was invited to participate in various OECD activities from the 
early 1980s and send liaison officers to the organization’s secretariat from 1989.  




technically efficient unless the country leads OECD best practices or manages to fully adopt 
the prevailing best practices all the time. Subsequently, this paper uses the Malmquist index 
approach proposed by Caves et al. (1982) that allows for technical inefficiency in estimating 
TFP growth rates. 
The basic idea of the Malmquist index approach is to construct the best-practice frontier 
using data on input-output combinations of a sample of countries, and measure the distance 
between any particular observation and the frontier. Following Shephard (1970) and Caves et 
al. (1982), the output distance function at t, D
t




0(Xt,Yt) = inf  { : ( , / ) }
t




 denotes the production technology which is defined as T

 = {(Xt , Yt): Xt can 
produce Yt at time t}. Xt is a vector of inputs at t, (Kt, Lt), and Yt 
is aggregate output at t. Note 
that D
t
0  1 corresponds to (Xt , Yt)  T

, and that D
t
0 = 1 indicates that (Xt, Yt) lies on the 
best-practice frontier. Caves et al. (1982) define the output-based Malmquist index between 
period t and period t + 1 as 
 
 
Mo (Xt+1 , Yt+1 , Xt , Yt) =                                                               (7) 
                                        
    
 
A value of Mo 
greater than 1 indicates positive growth of TFP from period t to period t+1, 
and a value less than 1 represents deterioration in TFP.  
As mentioned above, the Malmquist index allows for technical inefficiency by relying on 
the best-practice frontier concept in contrast to the Törnqvist-index formulation of the 
growth accounting approach. Following Färe et al. (1994), the Malmquist index in Eq. (7) 
can be rewritten as  
 
 
Mo (Xt+1, Yt+1, Xt , Yt) =            (8) 
 
 
Eq. (8) shows the decomposition of the Malmquist index into two basic components – 
“technical change” and “efficiency change”. Each ratio inside the bracket on the right hand 
side of Eq. (8) measures a shift in the best-practice frontier estimated at the input level in 
each period, and the geometric mean of these two shifts represents “technical change”. In 
terms of our model, “technical change” signifies the change in the prevailing OECD best 
practice, and a value greater than 1 indicates an improvement in the OECD best practice at 
the input level. The first ratio on the right hand side of Eq. (8) represents “efficiency change” 
measuring the change in technical efficiency from period t to period t + 1. Subsequently, 
“efficiency change” determines whether production is moving closer to or away from the 
prevailing frontier, and captures the efficiency catch-up effect between the two periods t and 
t + 1. The value of “efficiency change” greater than 1 implies that the country has closed the 
gap of its production method with the prevailing OECD best practice. If a sufficient number 
of observations are provided in each period, these change indexes based on pairs of 
successive periods can then be calculated.  
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4. DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
4.1. Total Economy 
 
The final sample for construction of the best-practice frontier consists of 22 OECD 
countries for which data on GDP, non-residential fixed capital formation, and total 
employment are available over the period of 1980-2006 from the OECD.Stat. They include: 
Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Among the current OECD member 
countries, 8 countries are not included in our study due to data unavailability; they include 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Slovak Republic, and 
Switzerland. 
Our measure of aggregate output is constant price GDP adjusted in 2000 prices. Total 
employment and the fixed capital stock are the two aggregate input proxies. Total 
employment is defined as the number of workers, and the fixed capital stock is the cumulated 
and depreciated sum of past investment. The fixed capital stock does not include residential 
construction, and is calculated from gross fixed capital formation – adjusted in 2000 prices as 
well – using the perpetual inventory method with the depreciation rate of 10 percent.
4
 The 
fixed capital stock as well as GDP figures of individual countries are all converted to U.S. 
dollars using the purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate from the OECD.Stat. 
For estimation of the best-practice frontiers, several methods have been developed since 
Farrell (1957). This paper uses the data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach to estimate 
the frontiers and calculate Malmquist indexes. In the DEA approach, the best-practice 
frontiers are estimated by non-parametric linear programming methods. We assume constant 
returns to scale (CRS) as underlying technology and calculate TFP growth employing the 
DEA approach. Variable returns to scale (VRS) may be an alternative specification of 
technology, but the Malmquist index is equivalent to the traditional notion of TFP under a 
CRS benchmark (Färe et al., 1997; and Ray and Desli, 1997). For calculation of indexes, we 
use DEAP version 2.1 (Coelli, 1996). 
Table 1 summarizes Korea’s Malmquist indexes and their decomposed indexes, technical 
changes and efficiency changes, over the period 1981-2006. According to calculations of the 
Malmquist index, the country’s TFP is estimated to grow an average of 0.6 percent per year 
over the period, slightly behind OECD average of 0.9 percent during the same period. 
However, annual growth rates of TFP tend to vary considerably from year to year as shown 
in Figure 2. For example, TFP growth was very slow during 1981-1991. TFP in fact fell, 
instead of growing, in Korea for most of the period, trailing far behind the OECD average. 
During the same period, however, the country’s real GDP grew strongly at more than 8 
percent per year as shown in Figure 3. This suggests that economic growth in Korea during 
the 1980s and early 1990s was mainly driven by input accumulation and supported little by 
TFP growth. Subsequently, the capital stock in Korea appears to have rapidly approached to 
its steady-state levels during the period. 
                                                          
4  Alternative measures of the fixed capital stock were also calculated assuming different rates of 
depreciation, but provided a similar pattern. Malmquist indexes and their components assuming the 
depreciation rate of 15 percent are reported in Appendix. 




Table 1. TFP Growth, Technical Change, and Efficiency Change in Korea 


















































































































If the Korean economy had continued to grow without meaningful increases in TFP 
during the 1990s as well, this input-driven growth would have further narrowed the gap 
between the country’s current and steady-state levels of the capital stock substantially, and 
its economic growth would have inevitably faced a sharp slowdown under the gravity of 
diminishing marginal returns. According to our TFP measures, however, Korea’s TFP began 
to exhibit robust growth from 1992, considerably outperforming the OECD average. This 
strong TFP growth is expected to have shifted Korea’s production function considerably, and 
accordingly the distance between the country’s current and steady-state levels of capital 
stock is expected to have departed the hitherto declining path and begun to widen. This 
suggests growing room for sustained expansion of the economy’s capital stock. In fact, 
during 1993-1996, non-residential fixed capital investment as measured by a share of GDP 
grew consistently in Korea as shown in Figure 4, and the country’s real GDP also grew 
robustly at an annual average rate of almost 8 percent. 
Following the onset of the financial crisis in the fourth quarter of 1997, Korea’s real GDP 
contracted substantially in 1998, lowering the country’s TFP growth along with it. However, 
Korea’s TFP growth sharply shot up to an annual rate of 7.3 percent in the following year.  













































Note: GDP figures are adjusted in 2000 prices. 
Source: OECD.Stat 
 
Figure 3. Annual Growth Rates of GDP in Korea 































Source: OECD.Stat, OECD STAN 
 
Figure 4. Fixed Capital Formation in Korea 
 
 
This unusually high growth of TFP in 1999 appears to have been largely driven by a steep 
slowdown of fixed capital formation in the preceding year in the midst of economy-wide 
restructuring. For example, non-residential fixed capital formation contracted by 25 percent 
in 1998. Following the exceptionally high level in 1999, TFP growth of the next three years 
fell back to levels which were much more modest than the 1999 level but as yet comparable 
to their previous peak during 1993-1996. Over 1992-2002, therefore, strong TFP growth 
considerably above the OECD average appears to have induced the Korean economy to 
manage to grow continuously, instead of falling a victim to diminishing marginal returns 
resulting from input-driven growth for more than a decade, by shifting out Korea’s 
production function and hence expanding room for capital accumulation. 
Following TFP growth on a rollercoaster ride during and immediately after the Asian 
economic crisis, Korea’s TFP growth began to stabilize from 2003, albeit around a lower 
level than those for most of the past decade. For example, TFP grew an average of about 2.7 
percent per year during 2003-2006 whereas its average annual growth rate over the period of 
1993-2002 (when the two unusual rates for 1998 and 1999 due to economic crisis are not 
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included) is more than 3.1 percent. During 2003-2006, Korea’s real GDP growth also visibly 
slowed down as shown in Figure 3, and non-residential fixed capital investment as a share of 
GDP fell to the lowest level since the beginning of the 1980s as well (Figure 4). The sluggish 
TFP growth during the period appears to have created only limited room for additional 
investment in fixed capital by failing to sufficiently increase the gap between the current and 
steady-state levels of capital stock, thereby slowing down economic growth. 
The decomposition of Malmquist indexes into technical changes and efficiency changes 
shown in Table 1 enables us to examine the nature of each year’s productivity change. In 
particular, efficiency changes illustrate how much Korea closed (or widened if the index is 
less than 1) its efficiency gap with the prevailing OECD best practice. In the early 1980s, 
Korea appears to have been briefly successful in narrowing its gap with the OECD, but soon 
begun to move away from the OECD best performance continuously from the mid-1980s. 
The country’s gap with the OECD in technical efficiency is found to have particularly 
widened in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, Korea appears to have begun to close 
the gap consistently from the mid-1990s. According to our calculations, this catch-up in fact 
continued from 1994 to 2006 – except for 1997 and 1998 when the country suffered from the 




The manufacturing sector has assumed particular importance in Korea’s economic 
development as the sector includes most of the country’s key exporting industries. The value 
added in manufacturing was less than 17 percent of GDP at the beginning of the 1970s, but 
the share continued to increase throughout the 1970s and 1980s until it reached almost 28 
percent in 1988. During the 1990s, manufacturing’s share of GDP became stabilized at a 
level a little below 25 percent, and still hovers around the level. However, the sector 
traditionally accounts for more than its share of the total output in generating fixed capital 
investment since it is more capital intensive than any other sectors. As shown in Figure 5, 
gross fixed capital formation in manufacturing as a share of the sector’s value added tends to 
be consistently higher than the share of non-residential fixed capital formation in GDP. 
Given the sector’s particular importance in capital accumulation and hence economic growth 
in Korea, therefore, we examine TFP in manufacturing by using the Malmquist index 
approach again. 
For the period 1994-2005, the best-practice frontier in manufacturing was constructed 
using a sample of 12 OECD countries for which data on the sector’s value added, fixed 
capital formation, and total employment are available in all years from OECD STAN. They 
include: Australia, Austria, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Korea, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. Aggregate output is constant price – adjusted 
in 2000 prices – value added in manufacturing; total employment and fixed capital stock in 
manufacturing are the two aggregate inputs. Total employment is defined as the number of 
workers, and fixed capital stock is the cumulated and depreciated sum of past investment 
adjusted in 2000 prices. The figures expressed in individual national currencies are all 
converted to U.S. dollars using the PPP exchange rate from the OECD.Stat. In line with our 
previous calculations for the entire economy, the best-practice frontier was estimated using 
the DEA approach with CRS as underlying technology. 
Table 2 shows Malmquist indexes and their decomposed indexes for manufacturing in 
Korea over 1994-2005. Lee and Kim (2006) also investigated TFP growth in the  





SOURCE: OECD.Stat, OECD STAN 
 
Figure 5. Fixed Capital Intensity 
 
 
manufacturing sector of OECD countries, and calculated Malmquist indexes and 
decomposed indexes for 1983-1993. Their calculation results for Korea are included in Table 
2 as well. It should be noted that the calculations of Lee and Kim (2006) are not directly 
comparable to our calculations. For one, the construction of their best-practice frontier is 
based on a different sample of OECD countries.
5
 In addition, the perpetual inventory method 
in Lee and Kim (2006) employed the depreciation rate of 15 percent, whereas the 
depreciation rate of 10 percent was used in our calculations. Nonetheless, Table 2 enables us 
to identify the general trend of TFP growth in Korea’s manufacturing sector during 1983-
2005. 
Korea is found to show historically robust TFP growth in its manufacturing sector. 
According to estimates of the Malmquist index shown in Table 2, the country’s TFP in  
                                                          
5 The sample in Lee and Kim (2006) consists of 14 countries including Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. 
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Table 2. TFP Growth, Technical Change, and Efficiency Change in Korea: 
Manufacturing 




1983  1.135   1.064   1.067   
1984  1.081   1.056   1.024   
1985  0.998   1.020   0.979   
1986  1.041   1.019   1.021   
1987  1.007   1.042   0.967   
1988  1.093   1.064   1.027   
1989  1.083   1.040   1.042   
1990  1.102   1.037   1.063   
1991  1.124   1.030   1.091   
1992  1.127   1.055   1.068   
1993  1.045   1.047   0.997   
                
1994  1.085   1.033   1.050   
1995  1.066   1.003   1.063   
1996  1.022   1.015   1.007   
1997  1.023   1.036   0.987   
1998  1.054   1.046   1.007   
1999  1.184   1.066   1.111   
2000  1.097   1.040   1.055   
2001  1.020   0.989   1.031   
2002  1.068   1.079   0.989   
2003  1.039   1.041   0.998   
2004  1.073   1.069   1.004   
2005   1.085    1.022    1.061    
 
manufacturing grew every year during 1983-2005 with its slight deterioration in 1985 being 
the only exception, whereas TFP for the entire economy appears to have often experienced 
substantial regress rather than growth particularly in the 1980s as clearly illustrated in Figure 
2. Furthermore, Korea’s TFP growth in manufacturing is found to have consistently 
outperformed the OECD average growth. This was not the case for the entire economy yet 
again. 
TFP in manufacturing grew particularly strongly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
suggesting that the sector increasingly expanded room for capital accumulation during the 
period. In fact, gross fixed capital formation in manufacturing as a share of GDP increased 
substantially in those years as shown in Figure 4. However, this strong TFP growth in 
manufacturing appears to have been swamped by gross deterioration of TFP in the rest of the 
economy, resulting in Malmquist indexes for the entire economy far below 1 during the 
period. It also appears that Korea’s manufacturing sector rapidly closed its efficiency gap 
with the OECD in the late 1980s and early 1990s when productive efficiency of the entire 
economy continued to move away from OECD best practices as mentioned in the above. 
Following the country’s economic crisis, the manufacturing sector is found to have led a 
sharp rebound in TFP in the midst of economy-wide restructuring. According to our 
calculations of Malmquist indexes, TFP in manufacturing even grew more than 5 percent in 




1998 when the country’s real GDP contracted by almost 7 percent, and accelerated even 
further in the following year at a rate of more than 18 percent that was considerably above 
the year’s relatively high TFP growth rate for the entire economy. A brisk pace of TFP 
growth in manufacturing is found to have more or less continued until 2005 in contrast to 
TFP growth of the entire economy which began to show signs of a visible slowdown from 
2003 (Figure 2). During 2003-2005, therefore, the manufacturing sector is expected to have 
been able to afford relatively greater room for capital accumulation than the rest of the 
economy by expanding gap between the current and steady-state levels of the capital stock 
more rapidly than other sectors. As shown in Figure 4, gross fixed capital formation in 
manufacturing as a share of GDP was in fact on a consistent growing path from 2003 against 
the backdrop of a continued fall in the share of economy-wide non-residential fixed capital 
investment over the same period. However, the extent of technical inefficiency in Korea’s 
manufacturing sector appears to have remained largely unabated during the period despite 
the sector’s robust TFP growth as efficiency changes in manufacturing are found to have 
stagnated around 1 in most years (Table 2). 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper develops a standard neoclassical growth framework to examine the recent 
history of economic growth in Korea. In our framework, TFP change is a key to 
understanding a country’s economic growth, and is assumed to reflect technological progress 
exogenously given to the country in the form of improving OECD best practices as well as 
the country’s changing capacity to absorb the prevailing best practice. Our estimate of TFP 
growth of Korea based on this notion of productivity change offers a number of interesting 
implications for the country’s past and also future economic growth. 
First, our findings provide evidence that Korea’s extraordinary economic growth during 
the 1980s and early 1990s was achieved mainly through massive mobilizations of fixed 
capital investment. Our analytical framework clearly indicates that this type of economic 
growth is not sustainable due to diminishing marginal returns to capital. In fact, our results 
provide a direr picture than most of the previous findings that tend to resonate with ours. For 
example, the most frequently cited studies of Alwyn Young use the growth accounting 
approach and find Korea’s TFP growth until 1990 to be similar to – not particularly higher or 
lower than – contemporaneous TFP growth in a number of developed or developing 
countries with much slower economic growth.
6
 According to our findings, however, Korea’s 
TFP generally deteriorated rather than improved during the 1980s with its growth rate 
considerably below the OECD average. 
Nevertheless, Korea’s economic growth has never wound down except for a brief 
depression in 1998 in the middle of the economic crisis. How has the Korean economy 
managed to sustain its growth under the gravity of diminishing marginal returns following 
input-driven growth for more than a decade? One may find the answer to this question again 
in the country’s TFP that appears to have begun to grow strongly from 1992. According to 
our analytical framework, this robust TFP growth considerably above the OECD average is 
expected to have enabled the Korean economy to defy the gravity of diminishing marginal 
returns and sustain its growth by creating ample additional room for capital accumulation. 
                                                          
6 See Young (1992, 1995). 
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In addition, a number of Korean exporters emerged as globally competitive companies 
during the 1980s and early 1990s when economy-wide efficiency is found to have suffered a 
continuous deterioration. Were they just a few outliers of grossly inefficient peers? On the 
contrary, we find Korea’s exporting industries were much more productive than the rest of 
the economy during that time. Lee and Kim (2006) show that TFP in the country’s 
manufacturing sector improved substantially at a pace faster than the OECD average during 
the 1980s and early 1990s in contrast to mostly deteriorating productivity of the entire 
economy. This relatively strong productivity performance of manufacturing in Korea during 
the period is in line with most previous findings.
7
 
One of the latest issues in relation to economic growth in Korea is how to make sense of 
a persistent growth slowdown from 2003. Many tend to blame sluggish capital investment as 
its major cause, but we find TFP growth also became noticeably stagnant from 2003. This 
finding in fact has interesting policy implications. The fiscal measures targeted solely at the 
demand side would have only limited effects unless they are accompanied by other measures 
that would truly enhance the country’s level of TFP. We also find that TFP growth in 
Korea’s manufacturing sector tended to keep up quite strongly even after 2003 unlike the 
country’s lagging overall productivity growth during the period. This strongly suggests that 
much closer attention should be paid to industries outside manufacturing, particularly 
services, in the government’s efforts at improving productive efficiency and hence fostering 
future economic growth. 
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7 For example, see Moon, Jo, Whang, and Kim (1991) and Dollar and Sokoloff (1990) among others. 






    Malmquist Index   Technical Change   Efficiency Change   
1981  0.955   0.958   0.997   
1982  0.988   0.944   1.046   
1983  1.020   0.955   1.068   
1984  0.984   1.012   0.973   
1985  0.961   0.971   0.990   
1986  1.006   1.029   0.978   
1987  1.009   1.030   0.980   
1988  0.985   1.011   0.974   
1989  0.961   1.004   0.957   
1990  1.013   1.016   0.996   
1991  1.036   1.046   0.990   
1992  1.013   1.031   0.982   
1993  1.029   1.032   0.997   
1994  1.039   1.025   1.014   
1995  1.047   1.005   1.042   
1996  1.033   1.008   1.025   
1997  1.015   1.023   0.993   
1998  0.968   1.008   0.960   
1999  1.077   1.021   1.055   
2000  1.043   1.017   1.026   
2001  1.012   0.987   1.026   
2002  1.039   1.005   1.034   
2003  1.026   1.003   1.023   
2004  1.025   1.026   0.999   
2005  1.025   1.017   1.008   
2006  1.034   1.004   1.029   
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